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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 02-4003
ARTHUR LEROY WOLFE, III,
                Appellant
v.
FREDERICK FRANK; 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(Dist. Court No. 99-cv-00456)
District Court Judge: A. Richard Caputo
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 12, 2005
Before: ALITO, BECKER, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
OPINION
(Filed: August 8, 2005)
The robbery charge was eventually vacated on collateral review because it should1
have merged with the murder charge under the felony murder doctrine.  
2
PER CURIAM: 
Arthur Wolfe appeals from the order of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his motion for writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254.  We affirm.  Because we write only for the parties, we do not recite the
facts in detail.  
On April 22, 1986, Wolfe pled guilty to murder, robbery, and conspiracy in the
Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas.   That same day, the Court held a hearing to1
determine Wolfe’s level of guilt on the murder charge.  Two weeks later, it convicted him
of second degree murder.  Wolfe was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder
charge and an additional one to ten years for conspiracy.  
In 1991, Wolfe filed a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”), challenging his conviction on three grounds.  He argued that: 1) his guilty plea
was not voluntary because he did not understand the nature of the charges against him; 2)
his conviction was invalid because it was based on material misrepresentations of fact by
police witnesses during the colloquy; and 3) his counsel was ineffective in failing to
assert a duress defense rather than recommending a guilty plea.  The PCRA court denied
his petition, and the Superior Court affirmed.  In 2002, the District Court also denied
Wolfe’s petition, holding that the state courts did not contravene or unreasonably apply
3clearly established federal law. 
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),
Wolfe’s habeas petition must be denied unless the state courts’ decisions “resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or . . .
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see
also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 384-90 (2000).  State court findings of fact are
presumed correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.  28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(1).  
Wolfe first argues that his plea colloquy was tainted because it did not include an
adequate explanation of the element of intent for second degree murder.  Both state courts
held that, considering the totality of the circumstances, the elements of each crime were
explained in sufficient detail for Wolfe to knowingly, voluntarily, and willingly plead
guilty.  See Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 446 A.2d 591 (Pa. 1982).  The District Court
found that “sufficient evidence exists to justify the state courts’ conclusion.”  App. 8.  We
agree.  In particular, as the PCRA court found, the intent element “was covered in
Detective Dougherty’s account of how the . . . robbery and murder occurred.  [Wolfe] was
advised that the facts as recited by Detective Dougherty constituted crimes and that if
those were true, a jury could find [Wolfe] guilty of those crimes.  Accordingly, [Wolfe]
See Commonwealth v. Fluharty, 632 A.2d 312, 315 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (“Thus,2
even though there is an omission or defect in the guilty plea colloquy, a plea of guilty will
not be deemed invalid if the circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea disclose that
the defendant had a full understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea and that
he knowingly and voluntarily decided to enter the plea.”).  
4
understood the nature of the charges and what the plea connoted and its consequences.” 
App. 234; see also App. 273 (“The court repeatedly asked Wolfe if the detective’s
recitation of the facts as he understood them was accurate, and Wolfe repeatedly
answered ‘yes.’”).  This holding was in accord with Pennsylvania law,  and Wolfe points2
to no decisions demonstrating that it offends federal law as required by AEDPA. 
  Next, Wolfe contends that his conviction was based on material misrepresentations
of fact by Detective Dougherty during the plea colloquy.  Wolfe admitted before the
District Court that the alleged misrepresentations were not “per se” false, see App. 8-9, so
his claim is actually that the Detective emphasized certain facts, while omitting or
downplaying others.  This claim lacks merit.  In addition to repeatedly asking Wolfe if
Detective Dougherty’s statements were true, the Court of Common Pleas asked if
Detective Dougherty’s story was “what happened in this case.”  App. 7-8.  The colloquy
therefore addressed not just the veracity of the Detective’s statements, but also the
possibility that he may have left something out.  Wolfe had the opportunity to supplement
the record at that time, but he chose not to do so.   
Finally, Wolfe claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
To prevail on a duress defense, a defendant must prove three elements: 1) an3
immediate or imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury; 2) a well grounded or
reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out; and 3) no reasonable opportunity to
escape the threat and harm except by committing a criminal act.  Commonwealth v.
Morningwake, 595 A.2d 158, 164 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).  
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because his lawyer failed to recognize and advise him of a duress defense.   All three3
courts rejected this argument, albeit on different grounds.  The state courts held that a
duress defense would have been unavailable because Wolfe did not fear Robinson, and
because “Wolfe’s version of the events surrounding the evening in question is replete
with intentionally ignored opportunities for Wolfe to extricate himself from an evening
doomed from the start.”  App. 276-79.  The District Court concluded that a duress defense
would have been available, but denied relief because Wolfe pled guilty as “an equal and
willing participant in the robbery who helped formulate the plan.”  App. 12.  
Under AEDPA’s strictly limited standards of judicial review, we cannot overturn
the findings of the state court on this record.  The state courts relate the facts leading up to
the robbery and murder in significant detail, and Wolfe has not come forward with clear
and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that these findings were correct. 
Accordingly, we hold that state courts’ decisions were not based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.  
We therefore affirm the order of the District Court. 
